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Analogies can be tremendously fruitful in physics. The history of physics
is filled with one successful analogy after another: the atom as plum pudding,
electric current as water flowing through a pipe, and so on. One of the most
famous instances of this method is Maxwell’s use of an analogy between the
streamlines of incompressible fluid flow and Faraday’s magnetic field lines of
force. With the magnetic flux density playing the role of the fluid velocity,
Maxwell was able to find fluid counterparts for the six known empirical “laws”
of electric and magnetic phenomena known in the 1850s. This analogy motivated
many of his later discoveries.
As physics today searches for insights into a theory of quantum gravity,
another analogy has become so entrenched that it has taken on a life of its own:
black hole thermodynamics (BHT). Originating in parallels between the area
of a black hole’s event horizon and the thermodynamic entropy established by
Bekenstein, Hawking, and others in the 1970s, counterparts of thermodynamics’
famous four laws were found for classical black holes, much as Maxwell had
earlier found fluid counterparts for electric and magnetic phenomena. However,
according to the standard lore, the 1974 discovery of Hawking radiation signifi-
cantly tightened the analogy. Now BHT is widely proclaimed to be “more than
a formal analogy,” unlike Maxwell’s use of fluid. In particular, the relationship
is said to be one of identity: “the laws of black hole thermodynamics . . . simply
are the ordinary laws of thermodynamics applied to a black hole” (Wald, 1994,
174). Relationships among various black hole variables are understood as the
manifestations of deep thermodynamic principles operating in the universe.
What causes your tea to come to room temperature is said also to cause the
area of black holes to increase. Not only is this surprising analogy said to be
more than formal, but it forms the basis of some very popular speculations in
quantum gravity.
We want to pour a little cold water on the claim that BHT is more than a
formal analogy. Analogies can be good or bad. When good they can motivate
new ideas and progress, but when bad they can lead astray. Indeed, Maxwell’s
analogies, pushed to an extreme, led to an aether composed of vortex tubes
connected by frictionless “idle wheels.” The history of science is littered with
good and bad analogies. BHT may turn out to be a useful and deep guide to
future physics. Only time will tell. Conventional wisdom in physics seems
entirely behind the idea that the analogy is as strong as it gets. In the face of such
unanimity, philosophers have a duty to play the “gadfly,” challenging not merely
societal assumptions as Socrates did, but also widely shared assumptions in
physics. By showing that the analogy is not as strong as is commonly supposed,
we wish to recommend caution.
In what follows we report a few problems with the analogy between ther-
modynamics and black holes and the main argument that seeks to join the two
together as one. We focus on three worries. The first is that BHT is often based
on a kind of caricature of thermodynamics. The second is an even more basic
worry, namely, that it’s unclear what the systems in BHT are supposed to be,
and furthermore, it’s unlikely that any resolution of this question leaves the
conventional wisdom surrounding the subject intact. The third, and perhaps
worst, is a challenge to the main argument that identifies black hole entropy
with thermodynamic entropy. The combined effect of these worries dramatically
decreases our confidence that BHT rests on more than a formal analogy.
Readers already familiar with BHT may jump directly to section 2; but for
those new to the topic, we present an introduction in the next section.
1 Black Hole Thermodynamics, Information Loss,
Holography, and All That
In 1782, the astronomer John Michell argued that a sufficiently massive star
would have such a strong gravitational pull that its light could never escape.
One hundred and fifty years later, physicists showed that such astronomical
bodies could form as heavy stars collapse at the end of their lives. The singularity
theorems of the 1960s, by Stephen Hawking, Roger Penrose, Robert Geroch, and
others, proved that we ought to expect such collapsed objects in our universe.
By the middle of the 1970s, these collapsed objects were standard astronomical
fare, named “black holes” after their characteristic ability to prevent all light
from escaping.
Investigations into the evolution of black holes showed that their behavior
can be described by simple rules involving a handful of quantities. This is
much the same as the situation in equilibrium thermodynamics, so these rules
are analogously called the laws of black hole thermodynamics. There are some
immediately obvious disanalogies. The laws of equilibrium thermodynamics are
phenomenological laws, and when they are underwritten by statistical mechanics
they only hold with very high probability. The laws of BHT, by contrast, are
theorems of differential geometry, and many of them are independent of the
specific laws of general relativity. Nevertheless, the analogy is striking, and it
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has played a large role in the development of quantum theories of gravity.
1.1 The laws of black hole thermodynamics
The laws of BHT are mathematical facts about certain kinds of geometric spaces,
given physical significance by their use in general relativity. Each of the laws
makes different assumptions about the system under consideration, but they are
all concerned with a particular kind of gravitationally isolated system. That is,
one thinks of the system as the only thing in the universe, so that far away from
the object spacetime is flat, like the spacetime of special relativity. BHT assumes
further that there is an event horizon, so that no light can ever escape from some
region of the system. The event horizon is a two-dimensional surface which can
be characterized geometrically, so from a mathematical point of view the laws of
BHT are theorems about certain two-dimensional surfaces in four-dimensional
spaces—one of time and three of space.
The geometrical character of an event horizon can be seen with the help of a
Penrose diagram, like the one shown in Fig. 1. This diagram is a two-dimensional
Figure 1: A Penrose diagram
slice of the spacetime. The spacetime itself is represented by the region inside
the borders of the diagram; the borders represent theoretical “points at infinity”.
In particular, the lines I + are the future endpoints of light rays that escape to
infinity. The worldline of any possible light ray is given by a diagonal line from
I − to I +, like the line ` in the diagram. This represents a light ray that starts
infinitely far away from the system in the past, then passes by the system and
travels infinitely far away in the future.
In Fig. 1 every diagonal line ends on I +. This means that every ray of light
eventually escapes to infinity, so there are no event horizons. Fig. 2, by contrast,
is a Penrose diagram for a collapsing star. Here we have suppressed the two
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angular spatial coordinates rather than two rectilinear spatial coordinates as in
Fig. 1. In the far past, at the bottom of the diagram, the star is at rest in the center
Figure 2: A collapsing star
of the spacetime. As time passes and we travel up the diagram, the radiation
source powering the star depletes, and the distance from the center of the star
to the curved line representing its boundary shrinks. The pressure from gravity
eventually overwhelms the star and an event horizon forms at the spacetime
point marked in the diagram. A singularity forms, represented by the zig-zag
at the top. Some light rays, like `1, now terminate at the singularity instead of
I +. So only some light, like `2, escapes to infinity. In fact, any light that enters
the shaded region will terminate at the singularity. So the shaded region is the
black hole region, and the border of the black hole region, marked by a dashed
line, is the event horizon. Since we can describe it geometrically, we can apply
the tools of differential geometry to make predictions about it.
The event horizon at a fixed time is (topologically) a sphere with a well-
defined area. The Second Law of BHT says that this area will not decrease in
any physical process—analogous to entropy’s nondecreasing nature in thermo-
dynamics. In this context, a process is “physical” if it satisfies two conditions:
the null energy condition and the cosmic censorship hypothesis. The first of
these can be interpreted as an assumption about matter. Roughly, it says that
gravity is attractive; two infinitesimally close light rays subject only to gravita-
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tional forces will be drawn toward one another. The second condition is a form
of determinism. It asserts that the only singularities in spacetime are hidden
behind event horizons. There is no telling what will happen near a singularity.
If the singularity is safely hidden behind an event horizon, then nothing that
happens there can affect the spacetime outside. The first proof of the Second
Law was published by Hawking in 1971. The proof is a reductio: supposing
that the event horizon shrinks, it follows from the null energy condition that
light near the event horizon will be focused into a point outside the black hole.
Focusing all this light into one point results in a singularity as the light beams
collide. But by the cosmic censorship condition, this is not allowed. So the event
horizon cannot shrink.
The discussion to this point has been essentially global. In order to identify
the black hole region, and hence the event horizon, we have to know what
happens infinitely far in the future and in space. This is counterintuitive. The
picture of a collapsing star alone in the universe seems entirely local: the star
shrinks until an event horizon forms, then it eventually collapses behind the
event horizon, leaving a black hole alone in the universe. Since the radius of the
event horizon can be calculated from the properties of the star, and we know
where the star collapsed, we should be able to find the event horizon any time
after it forms, without looking far into the future.
Like most, this divination rests on a trick. We know what will happen in
the future because the black hole is assumed stationary; it may rotate, but it
will not otherwise move. Moreover, it is spatially symmetric; either it rotates
around an axis of symmetry, or it is a still sphere. A spacetime with these two
symmetries is rigidly constrained, so any spacetime ripples far away in the future
can be felt throughout the spacetime. This is how we are able to know where the
event horizon is shortly after a stellar collapse—the symmetries of the spacetime
allow the event horizon to be picked out by local properties. They allow us
to say which observers are stationary with respect to the spacetime structure.
Outside of the event horizon, stationary observers move through time at a fixed
distance from the black hole. Inside, they travel toward its center. Geometrically,
these symmetries are represented by Killing vector fields. In the case of stellar
collapse, the event horizon is a Killing horizon, which is a surface picked out
by the Killing vector fields. A collection of results called the rigidity theorems
show that for any stationary black hole, the event horizon will also be a Killing
horizon. These theorems tie the global characterization of the event horizon to
local properties in spacetime and give further geometrical information about
the surfaces we’re interested in.
The rest of the laws of BHT are theorems about Killing horizons in stationary
spacetimes. The Zeroth Law of thermodynamics implies that temperature is
constant everywhere in a body in equilibrium. The Zeroth Law of BHT states
that the surface gravity of a Killing horizon is constant everywhere on the
horizon. Physically, the surface gravity κ can be characterized by the following
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experiment. Suppose that you are a stationary observer far from the Killing
horizon. Attaching a rope to a box of mass m, you lower the box toward the
black hole until it is on the event horizon and keep it stationary there. The box
will feel two counteracting forces, from you and the black hole, and because it
is stationary these forces will cancel out. Numerically, it feels you applying a
force with magnitude mκ. In Newtonian gravity, a body with mass m lowered
to a spherical object feels a gravitational force of magnitude mg, where the
gravitational acceleration g depends only on the mass of the spherical object. So,
κ is naturally interpreted as the gravitational acceleration felt by a body at the
event horizon.1
The Third Law of BHT is also an analogy between temperature and surface
gravity, but it has a rather different status from the other laws in the analogy. The
Third Law of thermodynamics states that the entropy of a system approaches a
universal constant as its temperature approaches absolute zero. The analogous
claim fails in BHT—a black hole with vanishing surface gravity may have any
area. However, it is a consequence of the Third Law of thermodynamics that no
finite series of operations may reduce a system to zero temperature. Bardeen
et al. (1973) offered the analogous claim as the Third Law of BHT: no finite series
of operations may reduce the surface gravity of a black hole to zero. Unlike the
other laws, Bardeen et al. did not offer a proof of this Third Law, only giving
plausibility arguments. By and large, the Third Law has second-class status.
But since it is a problematic law even in the thermodynamic context, finding
an adequate statement and proof of its counterpart in BHT has attracted less
attention than the other laws.
Finally, the First Law of thermodynamics is a statement of conservation
of energy for thermodynamic systems. In any thermodynamic process, the
change in a system’s internal energy is given by the difference between heat
added to the system and work produced by the system. If the system is in
equilibrium, then its thermodynamic state can be characterized by a collection
of intensive quantities: the temperature T, the pressure p, the rotational velocity
Ω, and others. Assuming the Second Law, the First Law of thermodynamics
for equilibrium systems may be expressed as the Gibbs relation, which gives
the change in internal energy U in terms of these intensive quantities and their
extensive partners
dU = T dS+ p dV +Ω dJ + φ dQ
Here S is the entropy of the system, V its volume, J its angular momentum, φ its
electric potential, and Q its charge. If the system has further intensive properties,
like charge or chemical potentials, these have their own extensive partners and
contribute further terms to the Gibbs relation. Note the assumptions required
to obtain this relation. First, the system was assumed to be in equilibrium. We
1The Zeroth Law has many proofs, but perhaps the most general is by Kay and Wald (1991).
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then had to assume the Zeroth Law of thermodynamics to count T an intensive
quantity and the Second Law of thermodynamics to write the quantity of heat
added to the system as T dS.
Like thermodynamic systems in equilibrium, stationary charged black holes
can be characterized by a handful of parameters: their mass, angular momentum,
and electromagnetic charge. In other words, black holes have no “hair” that
can be styled to distinguish two with the same mass, area, etc.2 The First Law
of BHT states that changes in the mass M of a neutral black hole are related to




κ δA+Ω δJ + φ δQ
where κ is the surface gravity, Ω the angular velocity, and Q the charge of the
black hole, and φ is the value of the electromagnetic potential on the horizon,
which is constant. Taking M to be the analogue of internal energy and A the
analogue of entropy, this equation is analogous to the Gibbs relation. Like the
Gibbs relation, the First Law of BHT assumes that the system is in equilibrium,
namely, stationary. Also like the Gibbs relation, derivations of the First Law of
BHT assume that the surface gravity is constant over the body—in this case,
the event horizon. As always, the proof of the First Law of BHT is a theorem
of differential geometry, and the quantities involved are geometric invariants
associated with the symmetries of the spacetime. Unlike the other laws of BHT,
however, the proof of the First Law does not require any assumptions about
the matter—at least not directly. Because the Zeroth Law is assumed in the
derivation of the first, and some proofs of the Zeroth Law rely on an energy
condition, the First Law would inherit this dependence.
In sum, the laws of BHT are four geometric facts about spacetimes with black
holes that satisfy cosmic censorship and some energy condition. The surface
gravity κ is analogous to temperature: it is constant on the horizon, cannot be
reduced to zero by a finite process, and multiplies the analogue of entropy in
the First Law. The area of the event horizon plays entropy’s role in the First Law
and is time-asymmetric. And generally, as evinced by the First Law, black hole
mechanics can be described by the evolution of just a handful of macroscopic
quantities, just like phenomenological thermodynamics.3
1.2 Generalized entropy, quantum effects, and holography
There is certainly some degree of formal similarity between thermodynamics and
black hole mechanics. Two reasons are taken to push this beyond mathematical
coincidence. First, attempts to salvage the thermodynamic Second Law when
2This is established by the no-hair theorems. Note that this is no longer true when one introduces
Yang–Mills fields other than the electromagnetic field. See Chrus´ciel et al. (2012).
3For fuller accounts of BHT see Wald (2001), Wald (1994, ch. 6), and Heusler (1996, ch. 7).
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dealing with black hole phenomena led to the conjecture that thermodynamic
entropy can be converted into black hole area, giving a Generalized Second Law.
Second, quantum effects near the black hole horizon suggest that the black hole
radiates like a blackbody with temperature proportional to the surface gravity.
These results suggest that the surface gravity and area of the black hole really
can be considered the physical temperature and entropy. And this motivates a
search for a statistical mechanical underpinning for black hole entropy.
Bardeen et al. famously questioned the analogy. They argued that the tem-
perature of a black hole must be absolute zero, because it is a perfect absorber.
If any thermodynamic system is brought near a black hole, it will radiate some
of its heat into the black hole—yet the black hole cannot transfer any heat to the
thermodynamic system. Since heat will flow from any system to a black hole
and never the reverse, the effective temperature of a black hole is absolute zero,
independent of its surface gravity, which may be any value. Bardeen et al. further
argue that black holes transcend the Second Law of thermodynamics. Because a
black hole is effectively at absolute zero, dumping in a box of entropy will not
change the black hole. They do not say what they mean by “transcend”, but
Bekenstein (1972) explains it in epistemic terms. If an external observer tosses a
box of entropy into a black hole without changing the black hole’s parameters,
then there will be no difference in external observables before and after the
box is sent through the event horizon. This means that the external observer
“cannot exclude the possibility that the total entropy of the universe may have
decreased” (1972, 737). Additionally, if one only accounts for the exterior of the
black hole, then it is possible to convert heat into work with perfect efficiency
via a “Geroch process.”4 Lower a box of mass to the event horizon, extracting
work from it. When it reaches the black hole, allow some mass to radiate away.
From a distance, the gravitational potential energy of the box vanishes at the
event horizon, so this radiation makes no difference to the energy of the box.
Drawing the box back up will take some work, but less than the work extracted
while lowering it to the event horizon. At the completion of this cycle, the only
difference outside the black hole is that mass has been converted to work at
perfect efficiency. Since the interior of the black hole is off the books, this is
apparently a perpetual motion machine of the second kind, a violation of the
Second Law.
These considerations led Bekenstein to formulate the Generalized Second
Law, which says that the total generalized entropy of the universe never de-
creases. Generalized entropy includes both the usual thermodynamic entropy
in the exterior region and black hole entropy, which is proportional to the area
of the black hole. If the Generalized Second Law holds, then whatever entropy is
“lost” to the interior of the black hole will be compensated by an increase in the
area of the black hole. This also prevents the Geroch process from violating the
4This argument is due to Geroch, who gave it during the question-and-answer session of a
colloquium he gave at Princeton.
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Second Law: when one lowers the box toward the black hole, the gravitational
interactions between the box and the black hole will cause the area of the horizon
to increase.
Establishing the Generalized Second Law has proven difficult.5 In fact, it
is easily violated. Consider some system with very small mass and very large
entropy. Dropping it into the black hole will only increase its area by a very
small amount, by the First Law of BHT, but the thermodynamic entropy in the
exterior region will greatly decrease. To block this counterexample (and for no
other reason), Bekenstein (1981) proposed that the entropy of any system must
be bounded by the surface area of the system. Such a bound would prevent
counterexamples along the lines of the Geroch process, but it does not appear to
be sufficient for establishing the Generalized Second Law.
A further thermodynamic analogy lurks in the quantum realm. In 1974,
Hawking argued that a black hole appears to radiate like a blackbody with
temperature κ/2pi. Intuitively, the picture is this: near the event horizon, particle-
antiparticle pairs are created by fluctuations of the quantum field. One of these
pairs passes through the event horizon and is ignored, the other radiates away to
infinity. The relative frequency of particle creation depends on the energy of the
created particles, and this depends on the background geometry. The particles
that make it to infinity replicate radiation from a blackbody at the Hawking
temperature.6
Bekenstein’s arguments and Hawking radiation are taken to show that the
analogy between the laws of thermodynamics and the laws of BHT is more
than formal. If this is true, it suggests a natural research program. In the
late nineteenth century, phenomenological thermodynamics was theoretically
reduced to the statistical mechanics of some microphysical degrees of freedom.
If the laws of BHT are the laws of phenomenological thermodynamics, and the
laws of phenomenological thermodynamics really are reducible to the statistical
mechanics of microphysical degrees of freedom, then so are the laws of BHT. In
1996, Strominger and Vafa calculated the entropy of a limited class of black holes
by counting string-theoretic microstates, finding agreement with the entropy
of BHT. This calculation is a feather in string theory’s cap, and other quantum
theories of gravity are tasked with replicating it in their own frameworks. So the
analogy of BHT plays a crucial role in judging the success of physical theories
that look to reconcile quantum mechanics and gravitation.
Combining Bekenstein’s and Hawking’s proposals leads to another puzzle.
According to Bekenstein’s entropy bound and its descendants, both kinds of
generalized entropy are bounded by surface area—black hole entropy because
it is proportional to the area, and thermodynamic entropy by fiat. However,
the entropy of a quantum-mechanical system is proportional to its volume. If
BHT is an expression of the quantum character of black holes, as Hawking’s
5For a review of attempts and their shortcomings, see Wall (2009).
6The problematic particle-talk of this heuristic story can be eliminated; see Wald (1994, §7.1).
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argument suggests, then the volume of the black hole as a quantum system must
be its area. These can’t both be right if there are three dimensions of space, so
one apparently has to go.
The popular response is instead to hold fast to the analogy, concluding that
BHT teaches us that the world has fewer dimensions than we thought; it is a kind
of “hologram” (Bousso, 2002). The degrees of freedom in some region live on the
surface bounding it, and the physics in the region is “projected” from the surface,
much like a hologram is a three-dimensional projection of two-dimensional data.
So, starting from BHT one infers that space and time are not fundamental. It is
no exaggeration to say that the analogy underlying BHT is regarded as the most
important clue we have to a theory of quantum gravity, and the holographic
principle as one of the best cases to build on this clue.
2 Analogies and Thermodynamics
Analogies can be strong or weak, and arguments based on them correspondingly
good or fallacious. Any two objects are similar and dissimilar in an infinity of
ways. What matters is relevant similarity, and relevance is in part determined
by background information and context. The reliance on relevance entails that
the difference between good and bad analogies is inherently a bit fuzzy. But
in science we typically have a pretty good sense of similarity because we enjoy
a lot of background information. The wave equation is ubiquitous in physics,
but we don’t try to identify everything that obeys it: quantum fields aren’t little
masses on Hookean springs, even if it’s sometimes useful to think like this.
Thermodynamic analogies can be found throughout science. Some are strong,
some weak. Interesting analogies exist, for instance, between thermodynamics,
on the one hand, and electricity, acoustics, and mechanics, on the other.7 Take
electricity. Let current play the role of heat flow and voltage play the role of
temperature difference. Then definitions of charge and power straightforwardly
have counterparts in heat and thermodynamic power, respectively, and a host
of electrical laws, e.g., Kirchhoff’s Current and Loop Laws, hence share close
formal features with famous thermodynamic identities. Similar claims can be
made for acoustics and mechanics. Here, given background knowledge, the
superficiality of the similarity, and disanalogies when one peers closely, no one
understands all of these identities holding due to some grand thermodynamic
principle at work.
Outside physics one finds thermodynamic analogies in economics, finance,
ecology, and more. Thermoeconomics is a good cautionary example. The
economist Fisher (1892), whose advisor was none other than J. Willard Gibbs,
sought a kind of parallelism between economics and thermodynamics. On its
face, the similar role of equilibrium in the two theories invites such speculation,
7For a discussion of many such analogies, see Karnopp et al., 1990.
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and the early twentieth century saw many attempts to develop economics as a
thermodynamic theory (as opposed to economics merely taking into account
thermodynamic processes, as it should). While some researchers continue
pressing the analogy, probably most economists now agree that the search is no
longer worth pursuing. Any isomorphism between economics and physics is
merely a coincidence or due to using similar mathematical tools. Here we have
a set of functional relationships, many of which parallel the thermodynamic
laws, but where the disanalogies eventually stood out, the lack of a common
mechanism was plain, and the absence of fruit borne became an obstacle.
BHT could turn out like thermoeconomics. Currently there is no consensus
on a common “statistical mechanical” underpinning of the Generalized Second
Law, so there may be no common mechanism at all. That is a major concern.
We don’t wish to focus on this possible disanalogy, important though it may be.
Rather, we want to direct attention to the prior question of whether the analogy
that motivates the search for a statistical mechanical explanation is really all that
tight.
3 Pale Shadows of Thermodynamic Laws: The Ze-
roth Law and Equilibrium
As we saw, under mild assumptions, one can prove that the surface gravity κ will
be constant on the event horizon of a black hole. BHT takes κ/2pi’s constancy
over the event horizon to be the counterpart of the thermodynamic Zeroth Law.
No thermodynamicist, however, would regard mere constancy of a quantity
to express the Zeroth Law. The Zeroth Law is a foundational piece of the theory’s
edifice. It does not primarily claim that temperature in equilibrium is constant.
The Law is commonly expressed as stating that thermal equilibrium is transitive:
that if a system A is in equilibrium with a system B, and B with C, then A is in
thermal equilibrium with C. But even this proposition undersells the Law. If we
peer under the hood we see that the claim of transitivity presupposes an awful
lot. In particular, it assumes at least
(a) that there is a such a state as thermal equilibrium,
(b) that systems will spontaneously approach this state—sometimes called the
Minus First Law (Brown and Uffink, 2001),
(c) that the ‘equilibrium with’ relation exists, and
(d) that this relation is transitive.
The Zeroth Law in fact sets up the equilibrium state space for the theory, asserts a
general tendency toward these states, and then imposes a structural relationship
amongst these states. With all of these assumptions in place one can then prove
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that there must exist a state function having the same value for all systems
that are in thermodynamic equilibrium with each other. This state function
then allows the creation of an empirical temperature scale. From the intensive
nature of temperature, it is also possible to prove that a system in equilibrium
has parts that are mutually in equilibrium, and hence enjoy the same empirical
temperature.
The claim that we find the Zeroth Law in κ’s constancy therefore seems a
bold one. At best it mistakes a consequence of the Zeroth Law for the law itself.
We have a counterpart of the Zeroth Law only if we replace the real thing with
an impoverished, hollowed out version of the real law. The Zeroth Law has
analogies everywhere if this version counts.
The reader may respond by trying to find BHT counterparts for the real
Zeroth Law. This is an important project if the analogy is to be a strong one. After
all, as indicated above, the Zeroth Law is really foundational in thermodynamics,
not something to be confused with mere constancy of a function. The state space
and fundamental concepts all hang on it.
A natural place to begin would be with thermal equilibrium. In BHT one
commonly finds the claim that stationarity plays the role of thermal equilibrium.
Stationary spacetimes have the nice property that the vacuum region outside
a stationary black hole has a Kerr–Newman geometry. Thus, reminiscent of
thermodynamic equilibrium, the vacuum region is given by a few numbers:
the mass, angular momentum, and electromagnetic charges. Everything else of
interest is swallowed up by the black hole. Furthermore, although there is no
proof here, one often assumes that after a body has collapsed, eventually it will
“settle down” to a stationary state.
Perhaps we have found analogues of (a) and (b)? No doubt this judgement
will be based on holistic considerations, ones considering whether stationar-
ity plays anything like the same role equilibrium does in thermodynamics. In
that science, for instance, isolated systems in equilibrium minimize their inter-
nal energy. Is the BHT counterpart of internal energy, the mass, minimized
when isolated systems are stationary? It’s not clear what that even means. So
there are many questions that would need to be answered before we agree that
counterparts of (a) and (b) have been achieved.
Even if we ignore all that, we submit that a significant and fundamental
disanalogy will persist: there is no ‘equilibrium with’ relation in BHT. Without
this relation, one will never get anything like the Zeroth Law (it will leave out
(c) and (d)), nor will one recover much of thermodynamics (because most of it
rests on assumptions made in the Zeroth Law). The point is very simple. One
iron bar can be in equilibrium with another iron bar. Can one black hole be in
equilibrium with another black hole? What is the counterpart of ‘equilibrium
with’? Suppose equilibrium is identified with stationarity. Then the counterpart
is one black hole being in the ‘stationary with’ relation with another. Does
that make sense? Certainly not if the thermodynamic system is the whole
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spacetime. Nor is it clear what this means on any “local” understanding of BHT.
Maybe we can evade this worry by relying on the intensivity of temperature? In
thermodynamics we can take one iron bar in equilibrium and mentally divide
it into two subsystems, each with the same temperature. Because temperature
doesn’t depend upon the “amount of stuff” (i.e., is intensive), we can do this kind
of division without ascribing different temperature values to the subsystems.
Here too we get nonsense. The black hole counterpart is dividing the black
hole in two and regarding each as having the same surface gravity. If we could
overcome this, still we face the fact that the surface gravity is not intensive
(discussed below).
Although we’ve focused on the Zeroth Law, that is only because it is founda-
tional and first. Worries could be raised about all the laws of BHT. Here, quickly,
are a few other disanalogies:
• The First Law of thermodynamics asserts that a function of state, internal
energy, exists. Internal energy in thermodynamics is distinct from total
energy, but in BHT it is identified with total energy, and ultimately, total
mass. And the lack of a local notion of energy in general relativity can
only compound trouble.
• Suppose we can make sense of two black holes coalescing into one. Then by
the area theorem the resulting black hole will have an area larger than the
sum of the original two. The black hole entropy thereby increases. But that
is so even if the two black holes were originally of the same temperature,
i.e., surface gravity, contrary to thermodynamics.
• The volume is important in many thermodynamic relationships, e.g., the
ideal gas law. It is of course definitionally tied for a cube with sides of
length l to be l × area. Area is proportional to black hole entropy. This
relationship forces awkward questions. Can we substitute black hole
entropy wherever we find l × area (i.e., volume) in thermodynamic laws?
That will make a mess of any thermodynamic relationship that includes
volume as a variable, such as the ideal gas law. Or do we claim that volume
is not the counterpart of volume in BHT? Neither option is attractive.
• Peter Landsberg once called the fact that thermodynamic variables sort
themselves into such a neat set of relationships between the intensive and
extensive variables the “fourth law” of thermodynamics (1978) . Loosely
put, extensive variables are variables that scale with the amount of stuff
in a system or its size, whereas intensive variables are independent of
the amount of stuff or size of a system. Entropy and internal energy are
famously extensive. Double the system and you thereby double the entropy
and energy. Temperature, by contrast, is intensive. Double the system
and it will still be the same temperature. It’s well-known that the scaling
of typical thermodynamics systems doesn’t even approximately hold in
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BHT and that this has important effects: e.g., the impossibility of deriving
the Gibbs-Duhem relation. If we restrict attention to Schwarzschild black
holes, now when we double the system, we don’t double the entropy,
but we do halve the temperature! No less than the most paradigmatic
intensive variable, the temperature κ/2pi, varies inversely with system
size.8 As the “amount of stuff” changes, nothing is holding steady and all
the relationships amongst variables are shifting.
By getting picky or a little deeper into thermodynamics we can find more
disanalogies. But there is no need to get picky or deep, as the lack of an ‘equi-
librium with’ relation will always haunt the analogy, insofar as the Zeroth Law
sets up the state space and basic concepts of the theory.
4 Entropy of What?
The previous point focused on whether the analogy is all that strong. Here
we focus on a fundamental tension in the analogy itself (see also Corichi and
Sudarsky, 2002). If the laws of BHT are the laws of thermodynamics, then they
must describe the behavior of thermodynamic systems. These systems are the
bearers of black hole entropy, internal energy, and so on. They must interact
with normal thermodynamic systems to obey the Generalized Second Law. But
identifying these systems is difficult. On the one hand, BHT defines black holes
as regions circumscribed by event horizons. However, event horizons are global
beasts and can’t be hunted by finite physicists. They are also inadequate to the
task of fully working out the BHT analogy. On the other hand, there are no local
horizons that can play all of the roles required. Resolving this tension requires
giving up some part of BHT. For example, the reasoning behind Bekenstein’s
Generalized Second Law applies only to global event horizons, but Hawking
radiation is a local phenomenon. Sticking to the global definition means rampant
nonlocality, and moving to a local horizon means keeping only a fragment of
the already distorted thermodynamic analogy.
On the most intuitive picture, the thermodynamic system of BHT is, or is
bounded by, an event horizon. Event horizons are intrinsically global. In §1.1,
we made the move to local considerations like the surface gravity and Killing
horizons by restricting attention to a special class of symmetric spacetimes. For
general black hole spacetimes, identifying a black hole region requires knowing
what happens infinitely far in space and time:
The location of the event horizon, or even its existence, is known
only after the universe has ended, or, depending on one’s religious
beliefs, to the gods looking down on space-time as a vast Penrose
8Classical self-gravitation introduces many subtleties regarding scaling (see Callender, 2011);
even so, the scaling here is not analogous.
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diagram. It cannot be known to mere mortals in the here and now
(Hayward, 2002, 569).
In fact, our ignorance of event horizons is as complete as can be. There is no
relationship between the location of an event horizon and the curvature at that
location. In particular, event horizons can exist in flat space. Consider a large
collapsing shell of matter. At any point inside the shell space is flat, and remains
so until the shell arrives. Send out a photon from the center of the shell. If
you do so early enough, that photon will escape to infinity. But if the shell has
sufficiently collapsed, the photon will be trapped. The trajectories of the earliest
emitted trapped photons form an event horizon inside the shell, and the horizon
expands at the speed of light until it is the size of a black hole with the same
mass as the shell. And it does all of this in completely flat spacetime. The event
horizon forms and expands even though no matter passes through it. You could
be passing through an event horizon right now and be none the wiser.
Event horizons can “react” to matter that will fall through them at some
point in the future, which makes them seem clairvoyant. But they are also
importantly ignorant. Anything behind an event horizon is invisible at infinity.
For example, suppose that a star falls through the event horizon of a large black
hole and then collapses, as in Fig. 3. Intuitively, a black hole should form, just as
Figure 3: Collapsing inside a black hole
it would outside of the large black hole. Not so. Event horizons are the outermost
surfaces of the region of no escape. So event horizons cannot form within event
horizons. As a consequence, black hole thermodynamics does not apply to
collapsed objects behind an event horizon.
This nonlocality has incubated a cottage industry in locally-defined after-
market replacements for event horizons.9 None is clearly adequate. Many are
9For further details on locally-defined horizons, see the review by Nielsen (2009).
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(a) Flat space (b) Curved space
Figure 4: A flashing loop at two instants
foliation-dependent, a major drawback. And it’s not clear that the foliation-
independent notions are really local in a relevant way: foliation-independent
horizons can exhibit a problematic clairvoyance similar to event horizons, for
example (Bengtsson and Senovilla, 2011). Without a better handle on what
counts as an objectionably non-local property it’s hard to see how to corral them
into any sort of order. And this makes it all the more difficult to get on to the real
work, which is determining which things are supposed to be thermodynamic.
The local horizons are all distinct and are furthermore distinct from event hori-
zons. Indeed, one can choose a slicing of Schwarzschild spacetime such that
some local horizons don’t appear at all, despite the presence of an event horizon
(Wald and Iyer, 1991)! Are the laws of thermodynamics meant to govern the
behavior of the event horizon, or one (or more) of the local horizons?
As an example of the difficulties, we consider one of the most successful
notions of local horizons: trapping horizons, defined by the following local
no-escape condition. Consider any spacelike two-surface in spacetime—e.g., a
sheet of paper—and draw a flashing loop on it, as on the lower slices of Fig. 4.
At every point of the loop, there are two orthogonal directions that the light it
emits might travel across the surface: directly away from the loop, or toward
the inside. Shortly after a flash, the ingoing light will form one copy of the loop,
and the outgoing light will form another. In flat spacetime, the ingoing loop
will be smaller than the original, and the outgoing loop with be larger. But if
there is a strong gravitational attractor inside the loop, then both loops might be
contracted into smaller copies of the original loop. If this happens, light near the
loop will be trapped, unable to escape to observers. For this reason, the surface
traced out by the loop as it evolves through time is called a trapping horizon.
Trapping horizons can replace event horizons in some applications. Assum-
ing the null energy condition, the area of a trapping horizon must increase
through time, giving a version of the Second Law for trapping horizons. Though
there is no univocal definition of surface gravity or equilibrium for a trapping
horizon, analogues of the Zeroth and First Laws of BHT also hold. The Third
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Law, ever-neglected, has no proof for locally-defined horizons, and has likely
counterexamples. However, the symmetric black hole spacetimes above can
be foliated so as to make the event horizon a trapping horizon. So the laws of
BHT apply to some trapping horizons, and in cases where an event horizon and
trapping horizon coincide, one must decide which properties to attribute to the
event horizon and which to the trapping horizon. Is the entropy of the BHT
system given by the area of the trapping horizon, or of the event horizon? This
problem is most pressing in non-stationary cases, where the trapping horizon
will not coincide with the event horizon.
One of the most important choices is whether Hawking radiation ought
to be associated with locally-defined horizons or the event horizon. Recall
that Hawking radiation is supposed to substantiate the identification of surface
gravity with the temperature of the black hole. In the usual narrative, the analogy
of BHT is merely formal in the classical regime—as a perfect absorber, the
black hole’s temperature is absolute zero. Hawking radiation gives a radiation
mechanism, making the surface gravity physically analogous to temperature
as well as mathematically. So the surface gravity ought to follow the Hawking
radiation, and by the First Law of BHT so should the other BHT quantities.
It seems clear that Hawking radiation is associated with locally-defined
horizons, not event horizons. As Visser (2003) shows, Hawking radiation is
essentially a kinematical effect: any theory of gravitation that uses a Lorentzian
metric will have Hawking radiation associated with horizons in it. By contrast,
the Generalized Second Law must rely on dynamical principles, like the cosmic
censorship conjecture and the Einstein field equation. Furthermore, the existence
of an event horizon is inessential to the effect; all that is required is a local horizon.
When Hawking radiation is associated with an event horizon, this is because it
coincides with a local horizon. If Hawking radiation is a sign of a cosmological
surface’s temperature, then cosmological temperature may exist even when no
event horizon does. This strongly suggests that temperature is borne by the
locally defined surface, not the event horizon with which it may coincide.
Despite all this, trapping surfaces have their drawbacks. They are foliation-
dependent, so whether they exist or not depends on how one carves up space-
time. Foliation dependence is the cardinal relativistic sin. Some of our deepest
intuitions about space and time—absolute simultaneity, perfect rigidity, and
more—have been committed to the flames on this charge. Foliation indepen-
dence is tantamount to reality, in a relativistic world. The laws of BHT are
foliation-independent, so it would be strange, to say the least, if the physics
they describe is bound to a choice of spacetime slicing. Most dramatically, black
hole spacetimes can be foliated so that they contain no trapping horizons at any
time, despite the existence of an event horizon. In this situation, the laws of
BHT hold for the event horizon, but there are no trapping horizons for them to
describe. So there seems no choice but to attribute the quantities of BHT to the
event horizon, on whose existence all foliations agree. But this brings us right
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back to the problems that opened this section.
5 Out of Sight, Out of World: Entropy and Epistemi-
cism
Despite the many problems with the analogy, what motivates many is the
thought that when objects fall into a black hole compensation must be paid
for lost entropy. The reasoning evokes nineteenth century experiments by Joule
and others that found the heat equivalents of mechanical energy, electrical en-
ergy, and so on. The First Law, and by extension the Second Law, was widened
with each new kind of energy that might disappear. BHT then seems the next
step in this grand tradition.10
Here is the reasoning Bekenstein uses in his classic article:
Suppose that a body carrying entropy S goes down a black hole. . . .
The S is the uncertainty in one’s knowledge of the internal config-
uration of the body. So long as the body was still outside the black
hole, one had the option of removing this uncertainty by carrying
out measurements and obtaining information up to the amount S.
But once the body has fallen in, this option is lost; the information
about the internal configuration of the body becomes truly inacces-
sible. We thus expect the black hole entropy, as the measure of the
inaccessible information, to increase by an amount S (1973, 2339).
The worry, in other words, is that when matter falls into a black hole the total
entropy decreases, violating the standard Second Law. It is then noticed that in
these processes the black hole area goes up. Assuming that entropy is additive
then leads to the Generalized Second Law, the statement that the gain in black
hole area will compensate the entropy lost when matter falls into black holes.
Arguments along these lines are repeated throughout the literature (e.g., Wald,
1994, 417).
The key assumption throughout BHT is that the entropy of a body that has
fallen into a black hole is lost. Why accept that? After all, steam engines, boxes of
gas, and so on all have definite thermodynamic efficiencies regardless of whether
or not anyone is looking, and it’s certainly possible that such systems cross event
horizons without any strong tidal effects much affecting them. Thinking of the
information loss paradox, one might gesture toward the worry that information
is lost if the black hole eventually evaporates away. However, the identification
of entropy with black hole area preceded the threat of evaporation. One may
also worry about the matter eventually falling into a singularity, although almost
10The first chip in this intuition comes from noticing that this is not what’s being done in BHT.
If the analogy with Joule held, then we would expect to incorporate gravitational energy into the
standard thermodynamic story. BHT doesn’t do anything like this, though see Curiel (2014) for an
attempt in this direction.
18
everyone expects unknown quantum gravitational effects to be relevant in that
regime.
No, the reason this premise is universally adopted is no mystery. BHT seems
committed to an information-theoretic understanding of the thermodynamic
entropy. Evidence for this claim can be found throughout the field. The original
Bekenstein paper (1973) explicitly embraces an information-theoretic concep-
tion of entropy, both thermodynamic and black hole. Using Shannon entropy
and Brillouin’s identification of information with negative entropy, Bekenstein
writes that “the entropy of a thermodynamic system which is not in equilibrium
increases because information about the internal configuration of the system is
being lost” (6–7).11 And black hole entropy is understood “as the measure of
the inaccessibility of information (to an exterior observer) as to which internal
configuration of the black hole is actually realized” (6).
This understanding is ubiquitous, from research articles to distinguished
textbooks:
Indeed, given that the entropy represents your lack of knowledge
about a system, once matter goes into a black hole one can say that
our knowledge about it completely vanishes. (Sethna, 2006, 94)
In short, as part of the growing infiltration of physics by information theory,
it is held that the entropy vanishes when it passes behind the event horizon
because we can’t gain access to it. The system itself doesn’t vanish; indeed, it had
better not because its mass is needed to drive area increase. But for the ordinary
entropy, when it crosses the event horizon it’s “out of sight, out of world,” or at
least, out of physics.
To our knowledge, no attention has been drawn to this assumption in the
black holes literature. Those familiar with the foundations of statistical me-
chanics, however, will recognize it as a massively controversial assumption, one
worthy of scrutiny.
If we grossly simplify a long and subtle history, we find in the foundations
of statistical mechanics two very different understandings of entropy, one “ob-
jective,” the other “epistemic.” Everyone agrees that gases expand throughout
their available volumes because that is the most likely behavior for a mechanical
system in that state. But what entropy should we use, and what is the physical
justification of the claim that that entropy most likely rises? Debate ensues.12
The objective understanding is found in the pioneering work of Boltzmann
and Gibbs, and it is now carried on by modern physicists such as Sinai, Khinchin,
Lanford, Ruelle, and Lebowitz. Using one or more of the entropies devised by
Boltzmann or Gibbs, ultimately the justification for thermodynamic behavior
lies in the detailed dynamics of the microphysics. Boltzmann hoped that the
11Note that if one switches to trapping horizons instead of event horizons, this is no longer the
case. Light may cross a trapping horizon but still escape to infinity.
12For a more detailed discussion of this history and debate, see Sklar (1993).
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dynamics is ergodic, Gibbs that it is mixing, and others that it is quasi-ergodic.
These are strong conditions on the dynamics. Some modern physicists such as
Lanford and Lebowitz hope for something weaker, namely, that “typical” (in a
precise sense) initial conditions follow “thermodynamic” trajectories. Note that
the probabilities invoked are interpreted objectively, as a reflection of the way
ensembles of real systems actually behave. The differences amongst all these
programs are hotly contested and describing them could fill volumes. However,
they all have in common an objective conception of the entropy and an explana-
tion of thermodynamic phenomena that hangs on the detailed microphysical
dynamics. Degrees of belief and information have nothing essentially to do with
why physical systems spontaneously head toward thermal equilibrium on this
view.
The epistemic understanding of entropy and thermodynamic behavior, by
contrast, offers a quite different explanation. Using the Shannon entropy, one
understands entropy in terms of how much information is conveyed in a signal.
The powerful perspective and methods of information theory were then brought
to bear on statistical mechanics primarily by E. T. Jaynes in the 1960s. Statistical
mechanics, on Jaynes’ view, is not a theory about the world, per se, but a theory
of inference. The Shannon entropy is a function whose value is maximized with
maximum uncertainty and which vanishes when uncertainty disappears. The
probability distributions in the formula for entropy are interpreted as rational
degrees of belief; in particular, how uncertain we are of the microstate of the
system, given its macrostate. So-called subjectivists hold that these degrees
of belief are your own subjective ones. Objective Bayesians, by contrast, hold
that there is a uniquely rational set of degrees of belief for one to have given
the evidence. Either way, so understood entropy becomes a feature of one’s
epistemic state and its increase is a matter of uncertainty increasing.
We have two broad schools of thought, one objectivist and one epistemic.
According to the former, systems behave thermodynamically because the micro-
dynamics makes it objectively likely. According to the latter, statistical mechanics
becomes a branch of epistemology, not physics; it is a theory of inference. What
leads to great confusion, we submit, is that the Shannon entropy, used by the
latter approach, and the Gibbs fine-grained entropy, used by the former ap-
proach, are formally identical. In fact, outside of the foundational literature, one
commonly finds expressions dubbed the “Boltzmann–Gibbs–Shannon entropy”
despite the three names each referring to distinct objects. While physicists would
not be fooled by a pun on the English word “entropy,” it is very easy to conflate
the Shannon and Gibbs entropies, interpreted as we have here. But the two
entropies can have different values even though they are formally the same. The
reason is simple: the probability distribution of one entropy refers to subjective
degrees of belief whereas in the other it may refer to objective frequencies or
propensities in the external world. If a Laplacian demon told you the exact mi-
crostate of a gas, that would affect the value of the Shannon entropy (driving it
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to zero) whereas it wouldn’t affect the value of the Gibbs entropy, as understood
here.
Although we won’t resolve this long-standing debate here, many believe—
and we concur—that it is a big mistake to identify the thermodynamic entropy
with any information-theoretic entropy like Shannon’s. Given the formal identity
between the Gibbs and Shannon entropies, it’s natural to slip between the two.
Arguably, however, only the “objective” entropies are suitable for identification
with the thermodynamic entropy. The thermodynamic entropy seems not to
have anything to do with people or beliefs. Perhaps the general thought is best
put by David Albert’s incredulity:
Can anybody seriously think that it is somehow necessary . . . that the
particles that make up the material world must arrange themselves
in accord with what we know, with what we happen to have looked into?
Can anybody seriously think that our merely being ignorant of the
exact microconditions of thermodynamic systems plays some part in
bringing it about, in making it the case, that (say) milk dissolves in coffee?
How could that be? (2000, 64)
The thermodynamic entropy is directly connected to efficiency and the amount
of work a system can do. These are perfectly objective facts about boxes of gas,
steam engines, and the like. A steam engine’s efficiency doesn’t care about
whether anyone is looking or not, our uncertainty, or our beliefs. Since Shannon
entropy does, it therefore cannot be identified with the thermodynamic entropy.
T; S; P; V; U
(a) Before
U
T ?; S ?; P ?; V ?
(b) After
Figure 5: A thermodynamic system, before and after entering the black hole
If this is correct, then there is no reason to believe that a body slipping past an
event horizon would lose its entropy. As pointed out earlier, the event horizon
itself is not a local observable. Minus whatever effects tidal forces cause (which
may be minimal or none), a steam engine falling behind an event horizon is just
as efficient as before and still has the same entropy—after all, you could follow
it in and check. It’s a mistake to believe that the entropy of the body changes in
any way. In particular, there is then no reason to believe that entropy decreases,
and therefore, no compensation is necessary.
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Finally, note that a potentially objectionable philosophy of science sometimes
creeps in with the epistemic approach. Why does mass inside a black hole get
treated differently than entropy? One answer, just discussed, is that entropy
but not mass is epistemic in nature. Another is more philosophical. Bekenstein
writes:
Entropy lost into black holes cannot be kept track of, and so one
should not, in ordinary circumstances, discuss entropy inside black
holes. Thus the ordinary Second Law must be given a generalised
form. (2004, 33)
This claim, which is hardly unique to Bekenstein, appeals to a kind of philosoph-
ical operationalism. The potential double-standard in the treatment of mass
and entropy is avoided by appeal to what we can measure: we can measure
the mass of the body that has fallen into a black hole—one can measure the
gravitational acceleration of objects around the black hole—but one cannot mea-
sure the entropy. The idea, familiar to physicists from Mach, is that physics is
only about what can be observed or measured. This position is a hard one to
maintain philosophically. By the argument that one should not discuss what
one cannot keep track of it follows that one of the authors (CC) should not dis-
cuss his teenage children! More seriously, it is notoriously difficult to precisely
specify what observation or measurement come to, and then it is equally hard
to justify using our contingent measuring abilities to determine the limits of our
knowledge. Quarks cannot be observed singly, but arguably we can still discuss
and even know about them. For these reasons and others the view known as
operationalism, which says that science is restricted to what we can measure, is
“nowadays commonly regarded as an extreme and outmoded position” (Chang,
2009).
No matter one’s philosophical predilections, the operationalism necessary
in the present case is a particularly odd and stringent version. The reason is that
we could observe the entropy of steam engines and the like that fall behind event
horizons. Just jump in with them! The fact that we would have few volunteers
for such a measurement shouldn’t matter epistemologically. Why prefer some
observers over others with no difference between the two besides what side of
the unobservable event horizon they are on?
There may be reasons to endorse the compensation argument that don’t
involve mixing up the objective with the epistemic. But if there are—and they
don’t already presuppose that BHT is more than a formal analogy—we haven’t
yet encountered them. We leave this as a challenge to the reader.
6 Conclusion
BHT may well be a useful analogy and a clue to quantum gravity. We are not
saying it isn’t. Nor are we saying that all the hundreds of articles on this topic
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have been a waste of time. Clearly, if nothing else, it has produced some very
interesting and significant results in classical general relativity and inspired novel
speculations. Nor are we saying that an information-theoretic understanding of
the Generalized Second Law isn’t true. All known proofs have serious problems
(see Wall, 2009), but this generalization about information outside event horizons
might still be true.
What we are arguing is that the analogy may not be more than formal. First,
we’ve shown that the analogy is not that tight. Similarity is in the eye of the
beholder. Yet one only sees similarity between the two theories if one very
selectively focuses on some parts while ignoring others. Second, we’ve pointed
to a major tension in the analogy itself. Is the object globally defined system based
on the event horizon, or a quasi-local entity based on trapped surfaces? Either
option has costs. Third, we’ve highlighted how a major motivation linking black
hole entropy and ordinary entropy is based on massively contentious reasoning
in the foundations of statistical mechanics. If we now add the fact that BHT
is only defined for a small sector of the space of solutions of general relativity
and the lack of a statistical mechanical grounding of the theory, we believe that
there is no urgency in explaining why black holes behave thermodynamically.
To the extent that there is similarity, given the heavy dose of geometry present,
one might suggest an alternative narrative where much of differential geometry
begins to look “thermodynamic” (see Baez, 2012). We leave such speculations
to another day.
Physical discovery is a game of bets. It seems to us that most of the physics
community is “all in” on the analogy being more than formal. Physical hypothe-
ses are proposed almost daily whose basis lay in no theoretical or empirical
advance but merely the extension of this analogy. But the analogy is not as
strong as is commonly supposed. BHT may go the way of thermoeconomics.
That is why we recommend hedging one’s bets.13
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